An overlapping generations model with the double infinity of commodities and agents is the most fundamental framework to introduce outside money into a static economic model. In this model, competitive equilibria may not necessarily be Pareto-optimal. Although Samuelson (1958) emphasized the role of fiat money as a certain kind of social contract, we cannot characterize it as a cooperative game-theoretic solution like a core. In this paper, we obtained a finite replica core characterization of Walrasian equilibrium allocations under non-negative wealth transfer and a core-limit characterization of Samuelson's social contrivance of money. Preferences are not necessarily assumed to be ordered.
Introduction
In this paper, we generalize the Debreu-Scarf core limit theorem to a case with a double infinity economy that includes such typical examples as Samuelson consumption-loan models with money.
For standard finite general equilibrium settings, the Walrasian equilibrium is Pareto-optimal (the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics), and every Pareto-optimal allocation is an equilibrium allocation relative to a price-wealth system (the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics). If we strengthen the concept of Pareto-optimal allocation to a replica core allocation (an allocation whose replica is a core allocation for each replica economy), we obtain an equivalence result where every replica core allocation is a competitive allocation and every competitive allocation is a replica core allocation (Debreu and Scarf 1963, Theorems 1 and 3) . This equivalence theorem between the replica core and the competitive equilibria is commonly known as the Debreu-Scarf core limit theorem.
In a double infinity economy, competitive equilibrium (with or without money) is not necessarily Paretooptimal (Samuelson 1958) , but it is known to be weakly Pareto-optimal (Esteban 1986 and Balasko and Shell 1980) . It is also known that every weakly Pareto-optimal allocation is an equilibrium allocation relative to a price-wealth system (Balasko and Shell 1980) . Chae (1987) , Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1990) and Chae and Esteban (1993) treat the core equivalence problem for Walrasian equilibrium allocations in overlapping generations models. Their approaches, however, fail to treat competitive equilibrium allocations with money.
1 Of course, an equilibrium with money (non-negative wealth transfers from the government) is one critical issue that the overlapping generations model tries to describe.
In this paper, we show that if we strengthen the concept of weak Pareto-optimal allocation to replica finite core allocation (an allocation whose replica is a certain kind of finite core allocation for each replica economy 2 ), we obtain an equivalence result analogous to Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1990) where a replica finite core allocation is a competitive allocation with non-negative wealth transfers and every competitive allocation with non-negative wealth transfers is a replica finite core allocation.
3
Our replica core equivalence approach (as well as that of Aliprantis and Burkinshaw 1990) has three important advantages: by concentrating on the equivalence argument without using the equal treatment property, (i) we can show a weak core theoretic equivalence result merely based on weak optimality conditions, (ii) we obtain a limit theorem of the core instead of a theorem in the limit measure space like Chae and Esteban, and (iii) we can allow for an argument based on non-ordered preferences, and hence our result may also be considered a non-ordered extension of the Debreu-Scarf core equivalence theorem.
4
1 Their concepts, such as the short-term core (Aliprantis and Burkinshaw 1990 ) and the short-run core (Chae 1987) , exclude equilibrium allocations with non-zero fiat money in two-period overlapping generations economies. For the shortterm core argument, as a simple one-good per period economy example pointed out in Esteban (1986) , such a monetary equilibrium is blocked by a coalition of all agents after a certain period without changing all but the first finite members' allocations. In the short-run core, we can also easily construct an example under which a typical Samuelson-type monetary equilibrium allocation is always blocked by the t-generation for each t-economy for all t = 1, 2, · · ·.
2 More precisely, this is an allocation, x, whose replica is a finite core allocation for each replica economy even when the endowments of some members are replaced by the allocation, x, itself.
3 In this paper, we use "wealth transfer" instead of "monetary transfer" because these two concepts are different unless we use the perfect-foresight assumption on the expectation for dynamics. In the sense of Esteban and Millán (1990) , we concentrate on the set of all monetary equilibrium allocations and competitive equilibrium allocations without money.
4 Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1990) , however, do not successfully treat non-ordered preference cases. In our model, a strong sense of the local non-satiation in (E.3) plays an essential role in the proof of Theorem 1.
The Model
Let N be the set of all positive integers and R be the set of real numbers. A pure exchange overlapping generations economy, or more simply, an economy, E, is comprised of the following list:
: a countable family of mutually disjoint finite subsets of N such that ∪ ∞ t=1 I t ⊂ N , and if I t = ∅, I t+1 = ∅ for each t ∈ N . I t is the index set of agents in generation t.
: a countable family of non-empty finite intervals,
for all t ∈ N , and {t | n ∈ K t } is finite for each n ∈ N . K t is the index set of commodities available to generation t.
t∈N It : countably many agents, where ≿ i is a reflexive binary relation on commodity space for each generation R Kt + , representing a preference of i ∈ I t . We write
, and has a convex better set (
It is convenient to identify the commodity space for each generation R Kt + with a subset of R N , which is the set of all functions from N to R, by considering x ∈ R Kt + a function that takes value 0 on N \ K t . Then we can define the total commodity space for economy ⊕ ∞ t=1 R Kt + as the set of all finite sums among the points in the commodity spaces of the generations. Clearly, ⊕ ∞ t=1 R Kt + can be identified with a subset of direct sum R ∞ , the set of all finite real sequences, which is a subspace of the set of all real sequences, R ∞ ≈ R N with pointwise convergence topology.
Given an economy,
t∈N It ), the price space for E, P(E), is defined as the set of all p in R N + such that under the duality between R ∞ (with relative topology) and R ∞ (with pointwise convergence topology), p positively evaluates all the agents' initial endowments:
Since for all i ∈ I t , ω i belongs to R Kt ++ for all t ∈ N , the price space of E always includes R N ++ for all E in Econ, where Econ denotes the set of all economies satisfying conditions (E.1), (E.2) and (E.3).
where the summability in R N of both sides of the inequality is assured by (E.2). The list of price vector p * ∈ P(E), non-negative wealth transfer function M *
is called a non-negative wealth transfer Walrasian equilibrium for E, if for each t ∈ N and i
Since the non-negative wealth transfer is an abstraction of the money supply in perfect-foresight overlapping generations settings, we denote the set of all non-negative wealth transfer Walrasian equilibrium allocations by MWalras(E).
A coalition in economy
Econ is a set of consumers S ⊂ ∪ ∞ t=1 I t . Allocation x for economy E is said to be blocked by coalition S if it is possible to find commodity bundles
For each E = ({I t }, {K t }, {(≿ i , ω i )}) ∈ Econ, the set of all feasible allocations that cannot be blocked by any coalition is said to be the core of economy E and is denoted by Core(E). Element x ∈ Core(E) is called a core allocation. The set of all feasible allocations that cannot be blocked by any finite coalition is called the finite core of economy E and is denoted by Fcore(E). Element x ∈ Fcore(E) is called a finite core allocation for E.
Replica Core Equivalence Theorem
For each feasible allocation x = (x i ∈ R Kt ) i∈
by E(x) an economy where initial endowment allocation ω = (ω i ) is replaced by x = (x i ). 5 Hence, we
Consider the following replica economy,
which consists of all the members of the m-fold replica economy of E(x) and the n-fold replica economy of E(ω) for each m ∈ N and n ∈ N . Let us denote by C m⊕n (E) the set of allocations x for E such that
6 Moreover, let us denote by C n (E) the set of allocations x for E such that the n-fold replica allocation of x belongs to Core(E n ). It is easy to check that if x is a feasible allocation of E = E(ω) such that (m + n)-fold replica allocation of x does not belong to Fcore(E m (x) ⊕ E n (ω)), the replica allocation does not belong to Core(E m+n ).
7
Therefore, we can write C m⊕n (E) ⊃ C m+n (E) for each m ∈ N and n ∈ N . It is also easy to check that
8 For finite economy E, the Debreu-Scarf limit theorem can be restated as ∩ ∞ m+n=2 C m+n (E) = Walras(E). We see below (Theorem 1),
MWalras(E).
Hence, the restriction of Theorem 1 to the case with finite economy E provides the following extension of the replica core version of the Debreu-Scarf limit theorem because there is no difference in our settings between Walras(E) and MWalras(E).
For finite economy E, feasible allocation x for E is a competitive equilibrium allocation iff its (m + n)-fold replica allocation belongs to Fcore(E m (x) ⊕ E n (ω)) for every sufficiently large m ∈ N and n ∈ N . That is,
As above, concept Fcore gives a unified replica core equivalence characterization for all non-negative wealth transfer Walrasian equilibrium allocations. Note that allocation x such that x ∈ Fcore(E(x)) is the weak Pareto-optimal allocations in Balasko and Shell (1980) . It is easy to check that the n-fold replica allocation of x * ∈ MWalras(E) belongs to Fcore(E n (x * )) for all n ∈ N and Fcore(E n (ω)) for all 5 In the following, we sometimes omit the subscript i ∈ ∪ t∈N It of an allocation for an economy as long as there is no risk of confusion.
6 The (m + n)-fold replica allocation of x is the allocation for E m (x) ⊕ E n (ω) such that for each replica agent i in E(x) or E(ω), we assign the same allocation under x in economy E.
7 Clearly, the replica allocation, x m+n , is feasible for E m (x) ⊕ E n (ω) and
, then there exists a finite coalition S in E m (x) ⊕ E n (ω) that blocks allocation x m+n . We can write S = S 1 ∪ S 2 , where S 1 (resp. S 2 ) consists of members in E m (x) (resp. E n (ω)). Then, coalition S * consisting of all members of E m (x) and S 2 also blocks x m+n ∈ E m (x) ⊕ E n (ω). Therefore x m+n / ∈ Core(E m+n ). 8 Note that the equal treatment property is not necessary for ensuring the above inclusion relations. Here we are following the replica core equivalence approach in Aliprantis and Burkinshaw (1990). n ∈ N .
9 But we have an example where the n-fold replica of allocation x, which is not an element of
MWalras(E), belongs to Fcore(E n (x)) ∩ Fcore(E n (ω)) for all n ∈ N .
10
Theorem 1: Feasible allocation x for E is a non-negative wealth transfer Walrasian equilibrium allocation iff its (m + n)-fold replica allocation belongs to Fcore(E m (x) ⊕ E n (ω)) for every m ∈ N and n ∈ N . That
Proof : [Sufficiency] Let x * = (x i * ) be an element of MWalras(E) under price p * and non-negative
some m and n in N blocking the (m + n)-fold replica allocation of x * = (x i * ), where S 1 is a coalition in E m (x * ) and S 2 is a coalition in E n (ω). Then, under (E.3), especially by using the strong sense of local non-satiation, an allocation (x i ) i∈S for S exists such that
[Necessity] Letx = (x i ) be an allocation for
for all m and n in N . In this proof, we denote by I(t) the set of all agents in generations from 1 to t, ∪ t s=1 I s , and by K(t) the set of all commodities that are available for agents in I(t),
Since, for every i, Γ i is non-empty and convex, non-empty convex set Γ(t) consists of all vectors z that can be written as
We will show in the similar way as in the proof of Debreu and Scarf (1963, Theorem 3 ) that Γ(t) does not have 0 as its element for each t ∈ N . Let us suppose that 0 belongs to Γ(t). Then, one can write Let I 1 be the set of i ∈ I such that β i ̸ = 0, and I 2 be the set of i ∈ I such that 1 − β i ̸ = 0. Note that Figure 1 ). 
Let us consider the 
Moreover, under the resource-related structure assured by (E.2) and
Next, we will obtain 11 Indeed, π(t) is the set of supporting price vectors for the better set atx i under the strictly monotonic preference for each i ∈ I(t), where everyx i is necessarily evaluated positively (at least as great as the value of ω i ).
Let us define for each t ∈ N , compact set ∆ 
